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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

J. S. PRESTWICH, M.D. and LEATHA
GRAFF PRESTWICH, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11263

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain commenced by
Appellant in December 1963, to condemn 50+ acres of the
property of the Defendants, PRESTWICH, et ux., for the
development and constructon of Interstate Freeway 1-15 in
the area of Kanarraville, south Iron County, Utah. The
Appellant appeals from the Judgment of Just Compensation entered on the jury verdict by District Judge C. Nelson
Day on March 12, 1968.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT
Upon venue change to Beaver County, the case praceeded to tdal by jury on the issues of land value of the
"taking" and damages to the remainder, the questions of
the i·ight to condemn, public use and necessity and other
jurisdictional requisites having been admitted in the Appellant's favor. 1 Both sides put on testimony as to fair
market value and damages to the remainder, it being:

For the Landowners :
June S. Barron, Cedar City Appriaiser (R. 214, 232)
Value of 50.07 acres taken ····---------------$ 8,608.60
Damages to the remainder ---------------------- 33,428.40
Total Opinion on Compensation ------------$42,037.00
Marcellus Palmer, Sal t Lake City Appraiser (R. 362,
380)
1

Value of 50.07 acres taken --------------------$ 9,106.90
Damages to remainder ------------------------· ___ 29,839.50
Total Opinion on Compensation ____________ $38,945.40

For the State:
Memory Cain, Salt Lake City Appraiser (R. 467,

468,471,483,485)
Value of 50.07 acres taken ____________________ $ 6,651.60
oo.oo
Damages to remainder ------------------------·---

--------

Total Opinion on Compensation ------------$ 6,651.60
1

The pages in the case file of the Court Clerk, as transmitted to the
Court on appeal, have not been numbered. Accordingly, the c.ase
file will be cited and referred to generally when necessary.
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W. Iverson, Washington County Rancher (R. 557,
558, 576)
Value of 50.07 acres taken --------$ No final opinion
Damages to remainder ----·-------(admitted existence
of severanee damages but could
not calculate them)
After four days of trial, the jury iieturned its verdict
into open Court on March 7, 1968, as follows:
1.

Market Value of the 50.07 acres
condemned ----------------------------------------------· ---$ 7,850.50

2.

Damages to remainder ---------------------------- 26,674.'50

3.

Total verdict ------------------- ·--------------------------$34,525.00

The Appellant filed motions for new tria:l, N. 0. V.
and elimination of ,all severance damages. (See case file.)
All of said motions were, upon hearing, denied at the bench
by Judge Day. The State appeals from the Judgment on
the Verdict. ( See case file.)
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL
The State does not seek a reversal and new trial by its
appeal herein. Rather, it requests that this Court reduce
the Judgment of Just Compensation by striking or eliminating therefrom "all severance damages" (App. Br. pp. 3-4,
15).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is nearly incomprehem;ible, disjointed, substantially inaccurate, without rec-
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ord citation whatsoever, and replete with argument. Such
Statement is not susceptible to response by Respondents in
accordance with Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P. Accordingly, Respondents will make their own Statement of the record of
trial:
1.

Total property BEFORE condemnation.
(a)

The subject property, before condemnation,
was a cattle ranch of better than 1800±
acres immediately west and north of Kanarraville (R. 47, 49-50). Situated in what was
known as the north, south and center fields,
the total farm had been developed as a balanced ranching property, consisting of meadow, irrigated and dry cultivated acreage
and grazing land ( R. 70-79) .

(b)

Under the best use of the farm, substantial
east-west, northeast-southwest, northwestsoutheast and converse movement was involved (R. 82-83, 172-173, 198-200, 337, 341342) . There were no limitations in going to
and from the various fields of the ranch
prior to condemnation, access being provided
by a typical north to south county farm-road
through the bottom land (R. 73-75, 79-81.
167-168). Beef cattle were fed-up and grazed
throughout the ranch by continual rotation
from field to field depending upon the growing season and weather (R. 78-81). Through
this rotation of livestock and cropping, the
1
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Respondents' livestock of several hundred
head, were maintained the year around.
(c)

In 1956, the landowners filed with the State
Engineer Application No. 28407 to drill a
well and appropriate waJter up to 3 second
feet for the irrigation of some 260 acres of
land in the west section of the north field
(Ex. 13, R. 56-59). After adjudication and
other water hearings in the early 1960's, the
Prestwich application was "designated for
approval" by the State Engineer in August
1963, four months before the date of condemnation herein ( R. 257) . Cal'led by Respondents Ito testify, the State Engineer
Hubert Lambert said that under the experienoe of the Engineer's office as of August
1963, only 1 % of all water appHcations which
had received "a designation for approval" by
the State Engineer were thereafter disapproved (R. 262). And the Prestwich application, itself, · was given formal approval by
the Engineer in April 1964, without any
further facts being considered other than
those already known in August of 1963 when
the application was "designated" for approval ( R. 265, Ex. 13) . Contrary to the
claim of Appellant herein, the value witnesses for the owners, in appraising the west
land in the north field as of December 1963,
did not evaluate the same as though the
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water under Application No. 28407 were actually being applied to the land (R. 350). To
the conrt:r~ary, the appraisals were premised
on dry cultivated land with the probable potential within the foreseeable future of irrigation water under the Appliication (R. 210212, 265, 350). Mr. Palmer in his appraisal,
made it plain that the west land in the north
field would have been substantially more valuable than as appraised by him, if the water
under the Application had been actually on
the land at the date of taking (R. 350) .2
(d)

2.

In the eyes of the buyer and seller in the
open market, the highest and best use of the
Prestwich property, prior to condemnation,
was as a cattle ranch (R. 195-200, 339-342).

Taking by State for freeway.
(a)

On a north-south access, the non-iaccess free·
way cut through the bottom meadow land
and middle of the north and center fields
and through the west of the south field (Ex.
1). In all, 50.07 acres was condemned.

(b)

In the north field, 185 acres of potential irrigated crop land were left on the west of the
300 foot wide freeway, permanently sepa·

2The State has raised no issue in this Appeal relative to the appraised value by the landowners' experts of the west land in th_e
north field on the basis of its probable potential of irrigated, cultivated land.
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rated from the balance of the north field of
which it was formerly part and parcel (R.
216, 375-376). No underpass or crossing was
provided in the north field to get from one
side of the freeway to the other (R. 28).

3.

( c)

In the center field, 300 acres of crop land
was left on the west of the freeway permanently separwted from several hundred acres
on the east of which it was formerly part
and parcel (Ex. 1). Only an "arched" overpass serving a former east-west county road
provided access to the 300 acres.

( d)

In the south field, the former access to the
county farm-road on the wesit was permanently blocked-off by the freeway. After
condemnation, in order to get to the south
field from the balance of the farm, the owners were required to gio into the Town of
Kanarraville (Ex. 1, R. 217). As admitted
by Appellant,. an underpass and drainage
box constructed in the south field by the
State, had its entrance and exit on different
property ownership and thus "made the box
unusable as a livestock underpass" (App.
Br. pp. 1-2).

Damage to remaining property AFTER condemnation.

In addition to the foregoing, the evidence was that the
following elements would be taken into account by the
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buyer and seller in determining whether the remammg
property west and east of the freeway had been diminished
in value as a result of the taking and the construction of
the freeway project:
(a)

Substantial disability in rotation and irriga·
tion of remaining crop land in the north and
center fields had been and would be experienced by the owners (R. 82-98, 216-220, 362·
370) . Land formerly irrigated could no
longer be watered as a conS€quence of the
freeway alignment (R. 83-87, 217-218).

(b)

'Jlo get from east to wesrt of the remaining
property in the north field (formerly a dis·
tance of about 40 feet) , the landowners, for
example, werie now required to travel some
3.5 miles down a frontage road, over the
"arched" overpass, around a sharp curve and
back up another frontage road to the other
side. Such effort and its converse were and
would be continually required in order to
maintain minimum irrigation systems and
crop rotation in the north field (R. 217, 96·
97).

(c)

The ranch had been sliced up into arbitrary
parcels east and west of the freeway. The
latter acted as a barrier prohibiting all eastwest movement and rotation of property use,
except at the "arched" overpass (R. 216-219,
362-363) . The remaining severed parcels im-

9

mediately east and west of the freeway could
not be operated as economically and conveniently after condemnation as they we1~e operated before condemnation as an integrated
and unified field (R. 82, 366, 216).
(d)

Substantial disability was and would be encountered by the owners in the movement of
cattle on the remaining property from one
side of the freeway to the other (R. 96-97,
218-219, 314, 370). Livestockmen and cattlemen from throughout the state, including
the chief farm appraiser of the State Road
Commission, testified that the "arched" type
of overpass will not work in a ranching setup inasmuch as beef cattle cannot be feasibly
and practically driven over such an air structure. The owners have been and were forced
to truck, for the first time, livestock from
east to west and returning on the remaining
property, a time-consuming and expensive
burden in the operation of the land (R. 366).
Other cattle ranches in the state of comparable scope to the subject property, which had
been similarly broken-up by a freeway, were
analyzed (R. 371-372). It was found by the
appraiser that the remaining severed lands
adjacent to the freeway had sold on the open
market for substantially less after condemnation than the price for which they had been
purchased before condemnation (R. 3711
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372). In the landowners case, no damage
to the remaining property eas.t or west of
the freeway, was predicated whatsoever on
the sheer physical loss or shrinkage in the
size of the total ranch by reason of the taking of the 50+ ac~es.
4.

The so-called replacement or cost of cure issue.

The "cosit of securing replacement-substituted land"
was never a legitimate good-fa:ith issue in the case. The
State made no offer of proof to show that other lands were
available in the immediate area which were comparable in
quantity and quality to the property condemned and which
would "cure" the damage otherwise caused by the severance and isolation of the remaining parcels so as to restore
the remaining property and the landowners to their former
economic position. But it now claims on Appeal that under
the testimony of the Respondents' witnesses, two sales of
80 acres each in May and June 1964 of land to the west of
the freeway and north of the rema:ining west section of the
Prestwich north field invokes the "replacement or cost of
cure" rule in the case, so as to entitle the Appellant to a
judgment eliminating all severance damage in the case
(App. Br. pp. 6-8, 14) .3 So far as the replacement or cost
acontrary to Appellant's claim, the record shows that these two sales
(referred to as the Callewaert and Pie mes transactions), were in·
troduced and received in evidence solely as severed tract transactions
as a basis for proving the diminution in the value of the severed
property of Prestwich to the west of the freeway. In other words.
Callewaert and Piernes, were a reflection of what happens to the
value of severed parcels which were left on the west of the freeway
in the area of the Prestwich ground.
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of cure is concerned, the Callewaert and Piernes property
were already severed tracts lying to the west of the freeway, infedor accesses partly landlocked, without water
and with no water potential and rough uncultivated land
(R. 229-231).
The position of the Respondents on this spurious issue
was consistent throughout the trial, viz., that the "replacement or cost of cure" rule had no application in the trial
since such lands even if available could not cure the damages mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 above and restore
the landowners to the same comparable economic position
as existed before the taking (R. 344). And further, assuming arguendo, the applicabiHty of the issue, the owner
himself testified that as of the date of taking, December
1963, he knew of no other comparable land available to him
for sale in the area ( R. 104) . The State did not disprove
the truth of such statement by any witness nor did it call
its own witness to show that as of December 1963, any such
lands were ava:ilable for sale to Prestwich.
The trial Court, in discourse with counsel, indicated
its awareness and judgment as to the inapplicability of the
"replacement or cost of cure" rule in the case (R. 345-346).
5.

Appraisal testimony of landowners.

Appellant's claim that the condemnees' appraisers did
not evaluate the subject property Before and After the
taking is a misrepresentation of the facts of trial. The
record is clear that among other things, both Barron and
Palmer gave their judgment as to :
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(a)

Fair market value of the subject property and
each part thereof viewed under its highest and
best use before condemnation (R. 197, 207-216
'
340, 358-361, 375-378);

(b)

The fair market value of the 50.07 acres condemned, view in relationship to and as a piai~t of
the larger ranch (R. 213-214, 359-362);

(c)

The fair market value of the remaining property
after the expropriation and the construction of
the freeway. Each testified that the "after value" of the remaining property was the same as
that before the taking, except for specific areas
proximately severed and affected by the freeway.
As to the latter, damages to s aid property were
ascertained by determining the difference in its
fair market value before and after the taking
(R. 216-226, 362-363, 375-378).

1

1

6.

Appraisal testimony of Appellant.

Memory Cain: The leading witness for the State,
Cain had been a staff appraiser for the Road Commission
until 1965. While he thereafter classified himself as a "fee
appraiser" between 1965 and 1968, all of said appraisals
(save two for Richard Dibblee) had been made for the
Utah Attorney General or special counsel (R. 442, 492·
493). His practice was to make appraisals of property
which were already in condemnation and awaiting immedi·
ate trial (R. 498). He had never appraised a single prop·
erty in Utah or anywhere else for a rancher, farmer, or
any agricultural property owner, either in or out of con·

13
demnation. When asked why he had left the State
ment thereafter to work continually for the State
Attorney General) on a non-employee basis, the
answered "I can make better money this way" (R.
1

employ(or the
witness
501).

Cain made no inspection of the total property of these
owners (R. 504-505, 506-507). He made no investigation
as to the holdings in the ranch, water rights, past operation and rotation or the highest and best use of the wtaJl
property. Cain appraised only the 50.07 acres condemned
and a small landlocked parcel ( R. 506-513). And while he
did not appraise the remaining property knowing not of
what it comprised, he nonetheless concluded that 'it had
sustained no damage (R. 509, 467, 468, 471, 483, 485).

W. Iverson: A life-long resident and rancher in Washington County, Iverson had been requested by Appellant's
counsel only a few days before trial to appraise the condemned 50.07 acres and no mor,e (R. 564). While Iverson
had not been requested to detemine damages to the remaining property, the witness opined on cross-examination that
the remaining property of Prestwich was worth less "after"
that it was "before" the taking, but he had not had time to
determine how much the damage would total (R. 576).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CASE WAS PROPERLY AND FULLY
TRIED BY DISTRICT JUDGE DAY AND THE
APPELLANT'S APPEAL LACKS ALL SUBSTANCE.
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Few condemnation appeals have ever been brought
before this Oourt which possessed less merit than does
this one. The issues raised herein lack both genuineness
and originality - genuineness because the questions posed
are nOlt actually raised in or supported by the evidence of
trial - originality because the questions raised have already been firmly settled under the case precedent of this
Court in which the Attorney General participated. 4
The case was tried as a typical partial-taking of a
farm or ranch property under the same legal framework as
numerous other agricultural condemnation suits, involving
the Interstate Highway, in Utah. That framework is 7834-10 ( 1), (2) and (3), U.C.A. 1953, which Statute lays
out the triable issues as :
(1)

The fair market value of the property condemned, together with improvements thereon as
of the date of taking;

( 2)

"If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance * * *
and the construction of the improvement * * *";

4Afthough indirect, yet in a very real sense, Appellant, under Points
I, II and III of its Appeal, requests that this Court overrule and set
aside the recent holdings in State Road Comm. v. Howes, 20 U. 2d
246, 436 P. 2d 803 (1968), State Road Comm. v. Style Crete, Inc .. 20
U. 2d 365, 438 P. 2d 537 (1968), and State Road Comm. v. Jacobs,
16 U. 2d 167, 397 P. 2d 463 (1964). Such decisions would, of necessity, have to be overturned in order to sustain Appellant's position
herein.
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(3)

"If the property, though no piaflt .thereof is taken

.
'
will be damaged by the construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages." 78-34-10 U.C.A. 1953.

The testimony of the landowners on the value of the expropriation and damages to the remainder, the Verdict of
the jury, and the Judgment entered thereon are eaoh and
all within the letter and spirit of these sl:'ttutory issues.
And the evidence of the landowners fully complied with the
case rulings of this Court regarding proof and establishment of land value and severance damage to remaining
property. State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383
P. 2d 917 ( 1963); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State Road Comm. v. Peterson,
12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961); State Road Comm. v.
Taggart, 19 U. 2d 247, 430 P. 2d 167 ( 1967). Moreover,
the instructions of the Trial Judge (none of whiich is subj ect of appeal herein) were in complete symmetry with the
evidence wt .tri ail, the statutory issues, and the decisional
precedent with respect to value of the condemned land and
damages to the severed and remaining property.
1

The value witnesses for each side preS'ented a striking
imbalance. For the Respondents - Palmer, whose services
have been retained by practically every Governmental
agency, Federal, State, and County in Utah (including hundreds of assignments for the State Road Commission) (R.
330-332) retained by small and large farmers and the
major livestock outfits in the State (R. 328-329), and
pro 1Jably the most qualified agricultural appraiser in Utah,
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gave testimony of documented case study of what happens
to the market value of the remaining property of a ranch
when a non-access freeway cuts it into fragmented parts
with no provision for farm underpasses. - Barron, a conservatively oriented appraiser, long an employee of the
Farmers Home Administration in Cedar City, had appraised and was familiar with more real property in Iron
County than any other witnesses.
Against Palmer and Barron, the State called two witnesses: - Cain never appraised or testified as an expert
for anyone excepit the Attorney General. A "fee" appraiser
on continual re tainment from the Attorney General, he had
never appraised property for any landowner in condemnation. His testimony at trial, particularly on cross-examination, stands as an almost classic example of inconsistency. - Iverson, a rancher from Washington County who
acknowledged and admitted that there were severance damages to the remainder, was not able to calculate their
amount because he had not been requested to and wasn't
given the time to appraise such damages.
1

The rather complete lack of credibility in the State's
evidence underscored the brute facts of the case - that
the Hoad Commission had constructed a non-access freeway
for more than three miles through the center of one of the
largest irrigated ranches in Iron County, severing some
485 acres on the west from the balance of the farm with
no means of crossing provided for the owner to get to and
from the remainder lands. Only an "arched" overpass near
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the center field prevented the entire property on the west
from being landlocked and such structure could not be
practically used for driving beef cattle. Along with the 3.5
mile trips to reach the west or the north field (formerly a
distance of only 40 feet), these were some of the problems
which confronted the buyer and seller in purchasing the
remainder property after condemnation.
The issues of land value and severance damages were
questions of fact for the jury whose decision this Court is
loathe to disturb. Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. v. N elson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960); State Road Comm.
V. Stanger, 21 U. 2d 185, 442 P. 2d 941 (1968).
1

The jury verdict on severance damage is, in whole,
supported by the substantial evidence as above indicated.
Such vierdict; is not to be set aside on this appeal in what
amounts to a "rehash" of law questions previously decided
by this Court.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED
UNDER THE RULING PRECEDENT THAT
THE LANDOWNER HAD, INDEED, MET
THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING SEVERANCE
DAMAGES TO THE REMAINDER PROPERTY.
The issues raised by Appellant are the subject of quick
resolution once the testimony and rulings of the Trial Court
are known. The State, in Point I of its Brief, seems to
claim that the owners were not entitled to the recovery orf
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severance damages to the remainding property because, to
us their words: "In no place did the Defendants make any
offer whatsoever of any proof :to show that they were entitled to severance damage". (App. Br. p. 5). As alleged
support for such statement, Appellant cites and quotes
from State Road Comm. v. Howes, 20 U. 2d 246, 436 P. 2d
803 (1968) .5 Appellant then proceeds in the next breath
to allege the reason why the owners did not meet their burden of proof on damages, to-wit, because it is claimed there
was other available land in the area to "rep'lace" the 50.07
acres condemned. Thus, it is contended that since the condemnees did not make proper proof on such point, all severance damages awarded as merged in the Judgment should
be totally stricken. The response to this esoteric claim is
not complex. To begin with, it was acknowledged at trial
and is admitted here that the owner, in eminerut domain,
must go forward with evidence and proof on the issues of
land value within the taking and damages to the severed
and remainder p1"'0perty. Such principle, however, was
,apart of the ruling law in this jurisdiction long before the
dicta in Howes. A series of decisions have so held. 6
Simply put then, the question is what factors need the
owner prove in his case to make a prima f acre showing of
5The citation from Howes in Appellant's Brief, p. 5, is a misquote of
Justice Callister's opinion. The quoted sentence is not, in fact, complete and self-contained as made to appear, but rather is part of a
la:::ger sentence and statement.

soregon Shortline R. Co. v. Russell, et al., 27 Utah 457, 76 Pac. 345
(1904); Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Co., 40 Utah
105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911); State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d
317. 366 P. 2d 76 (1961).
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entitlement to severance damages ?7 The answer is thrut the
burden of going forward on the rissue of severance damages
is made by:
( 1)

factual proof that the property condemned is but
part of a larger remaining property, contiguous
or non-contiguous, having the same highest and
best use and unity of ownership; 4 Nichols on
Eminent Domm:n, 494, §14.1 et seq.;

(2)

expert or landowner opinion that, by reason of
the "taking" and construction of the freeway as
proposed, the rema!ining property or particular
parts, have been diminished in the former market value. In making such proof, the "before
and after" rule is applicable. State Road Comm.
v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961);
State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189
P. 2d 113 (rn48). 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 511 §14.21. 8

That 78-34-10 ( 2) and ( 3) and the decisions of this
Court (if not the constitutional mandate of Art. I §22),
1ndeed, what factors does the owner need to prove to show market
value of the land within the actual taking? The cases are legion that
expert testimony on fair market value, or even the testimony of the
owner himself, is quite sufficient to sustain the burden of proof and
award. Southern Pacific Co. v. A.rthur, supra; Provo River Water
Users Assoc. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, Ul3 P. 2d 777 (1943); State
Roud Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 2d 248, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964).

7

9And

of course, damage to remainder property must be special to the
particular property involved, i.e., damage that is directly attributable
to the highway project and the taking. 4 Nichols on Em. Dom.
475 §14.1. No objection or question on this factor was at all raised
in the trial.
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contemplate and require no more and no less than these
factors, is elementary and beyond reasonable debate. The
landowners herein made precisely this proof at trial. In
detail, testimony was given as to the total ranch, its best
use in operation, waiter rights, and different types of property. The condemned property was identified in its relationship to and as a part of a larger ranch. And the value
witnesses for the Respondents testified without equivocation with respect to the remainder property, its value be·
fore and after condemnation, and as to the remainder
property directly affected. by the taking, the before and
after values of the same.
What other conditions or factors need be proven by
the landowners under its burden of proof? The Appellant
does not say or specify in its Brief, save possibly one namely, the purchase of so-called replacement land to cure
the severance damage.
1.

"Replacement or Cost-to-Cure" rule is totally inap·
plicable.

The gist of what Appellant's counsel says in his Point
I, is tied up in the "replacement or cost-to-cure" rule of
severance damages. Although the State made no offer of
proof as to the availability in December 1963, of any re·
placement property in the area which would cure the sever·
ance injuries outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Statement of Facts, it is nevertheless contended. that somehow
under the authority of the Howes decision, the owner had
the burden of showing the unavailability of such land as a
condition to the recovery of severance damages. And fur
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ther, it is argued that if there were other land available for
purchase, these owners had an obligation to make such
purchase out of pocket in order to mitigate damages.
Appellant should re-examine the decision in State
Road Comm. v. Howes, supra, for the ruling which evolve.I
in that case is the precise antithesis of that which State
counsel claims for it herein. For in Howes, this Court
writing through Justice Callister, flatly held that the condemnee is not required, as a condition to the proof and recovery of severance damages, to show the unavailability of
other property in the area:
"We hold that in a condemnation action it is
the condemnee's burden to prove severance damage,
but that before doing so he does not generally have
the burden of first showing that such damage, if
any, could not be minimizeJ or mitigated." 436 P.
2d at 804.
By Point I of its Brief, Appellant reargues the same
point which the Appellant argued in HouJes and lost. But
even apart from the question of whose burden it is to raise
the "replacement" issue, it is a fair statement that with
respect to the merits of this particular principle of damage:,, no one who has reasonably read and understood the
decisions of this Court 9 on this point and thus, the presently
developed stwte •of law, could seriously urge its application
in the case at Bar.
See the discussion in State Road Comm. v. Howes, supra, and the
late,;t opinion of State Road Comm. v. Style Crete, Inc., 20 U. 2d 365,
438 P. 2d 537 (1968). both of which directly deal with the "replacement" principle, and the application of the Carlsen and Co-op SeClirit1· holdings in a severance damage case.

9
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It is crystal clear and beyond argument that ,the dam.

age to the remainder property west and east of the freeway
as described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Statement of
Facts herein could not conceivably be cured by purchasing
other properties in the area (even assuming, arguendo,
that other property was available). Under the holding of
this Court in the Howes and Style Crete decisions, the "replacement or cost-of-cure" rule is only relevant and admissible on the question of severance damages when :
(a)

substantially comparable property in quality and
quantity, is known to be available rto the con·
demnee for sale as of the date of taking; and

(b)

such property purchase, if substituted for and in
place of the property actually condemned, will
cure the severance damages otherwise caused so
that the owner is in the same "relwtive position
as before the taking". State v. Style Crete, Inc.,
supra.

The claim of Appellant, thus viewed in the light of
Howes and Style Crete,1° is spurious. Such claim, in sub·
stance, is that because two 80 acre pieces (on the west side
of the freeway) to the north and west of the remaining
ranch sold five to six months after the date of taking, the
law requires, in determining severance damages, that these
owners purchase the same in mitigation. In fact, the land
was not comparable in either quantity ( 160 acres to 50.07
Appellant has failed to refer to the Style Crete holding, although it
was substantially referred to and discussed on the motion for new
trial before Judge Day.

10
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acres) or quality (rough uncultivated acreage as against
cultivated and meadow land condemned). But just as important, the purchase of said additional tracts by these
owners would not have at all cured the severance damage
or ri'.stored the owners to their former position as required
by Howes and Style Crete. Indeed, such purchase would
have amplified and enlarged the severance damage because
there iuould have been rnore severed property on the west
of thP freeway. And so it was, that Judge Day was not in
error when after substantial discussion with counsel and
consideration of the State's theory as it related to Howes
(and later Style Crete), he ruled that the "replacement"
rule had no relevancy in the trial.
The Iast part of Appellant's argument (page 8 of its
Brief) , that the owners must purchase the claimed replacement prope1'ty at their own expense to mitigate severance
damages, is equally spurious. The Co-op Security and Carlsen cases, as discussed in Style Crete and Howes, do not say
any such thing, and this Court has never intimated that
sueh a bizarre result might be in store for a landowner in
a p<>.rtial-taking case. Ca1·lsen and Co-op Security hold that
if and when the "relacement" rule is applicable, se'verance
damages are to be measured by the cost of acquiring the
comparable substitute property and that cost is to be assessed and awarded as part of the Judgment of Just Compe11sation. Yet Appellant in Point I asks the Court to strike
from the Judgment all severance damages. Even under
theil' erroneous theory, as warped as it is, substantial damages would be owing to the landowners.
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In all, Point I of Appellant's Appeal illustrates a lack
of appreciation of the "replacement or cost-to-cure" rule
and its relationship to the severance damage concept in
eminent domain. The trial court did nat err and it should
be affirmed.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE EXPERT WITNESSES FOR THE
LANDOWNER DID APPRAISE THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.
Appellant claims in Point II of its Brief that the trial
Court erred in determining that the expert witnesses for
the landowners, in determining severance damages or the
difference between the damaged property before and after
condemnation, improperly evaluated such damage under the
law. The reason given for the claim is that the DefendanUi
"having elected" to consider the ranch as an "economic
unit", were required to appraise the total ranch before
and after condemnation. The argument is a paradox and
again, stems from the failure to recognize the law issues
before the Court in a severance damage case and the in-fact
evidence received. Appellant's argument is without merit.
Contrary to Appellant's lament, there is nothing at all
magic about the conclusion, made by the experts, that the
ranch, before condemnation, constituted a total ranch unit.
Such result is merely a part of the general investigatory
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and conclusion process of the appraiser which is necessarily involved in every partial-taking case. McMichael's Appraising Manuel, Appraising for Condemnation, p. 456 (5th
Ed.). As to the admissibility of evidence with respect to
severance damage, the appraiser must, indeed, investigate
the larger property, a part of which is condemned, as a
condition to testimony on damages to the remainder caused
by the severance and highway consrtruotion under 78-3410 ( 2) and (3) U.C.A. 1953. Elsewise, the expert would be
in no position to conclude that the condemned property was
but part of a larger tract of land with unity of use and
ownership. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. Ed. 270,
17 S. Ct. 966; 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 511 §14.21.
In all events, the record herein reflects fully that the
landowners' experts, Palmer and Barron, did just that
which Appellant claims should have been done - they did
appraise the entire ranch before the taking; they did evaluate the fair market value of the 50.07 acres condemned,
viewed as part of the larger property; they did evaluate the
remaining property after condemnation and they did determine damages to said remainder by determining in their
juJgment, the difference in the fair market value of the
said property before and after condemnation. The record
could not be clearer on this point and Appellant's attempt
to distort or portray the testimony otherwise as it claims in
its Brief is unworthy of the Appellant.
The testimony before the Court wholly parallelled the
approach to value pursued by the witnesses in State Road
Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 ( 1961) (a
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ranching operation) and thus is in harmony wi'th the pronouncement of this Court in tha;t case :
"As to the error assigned in instructing on
damages: notwithstanding the zealous efforts of
counsel to torture them, we think they were such
that the jury understood and applied the correct
measure of damages : for the land actually :taken:
the fair cash mark!et value on the date of condemnation; and for severance damages to the remainder:
the difference between its fair cash market value
before and after the taking."
There was no error.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED
EVIDENCE OF THE PROBABLE POTENTIAL
OF THE WELL APPLICATION NO. 28407 AS
THE SAME RELATED TO THE VALUE OF
THE WEST SECTION OF THE NORTH FIELD
BEFORE CONDEMNATION.
Lastly, Appellant argues that Judge Day erred in allowing the experts for the owners to speculate on the approval of well Application No. 28407 in determining the
value of the condemnej property before condemnation. In
so arguing, Appellant does not suggest how such testimony
was prejudicial to the result in the case, a responsibility
which it clearly has to this Court. Lemmon v. D. & R. G.
W.R. R. Co., 9 U. 2d 195, 341P.2d 215 (1959). And the
relief which the Appellant requests in this appeal has no
relationship, in fact or law, to the question raised in Point
III of its Brief.
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Nevertheless, the short response to this claim is that
the testimony of the Defendants on the water Application
was not speculative in law. The evidence shows beyond
dispute that the State Engineer had "designated" the Application (on file since 1956) for approval four months
prior to the date of taking herein, and rthe State Engineer,
himself, testified that the Engineer typically gives formal
approval to 95% of those applicaitions as to which "approval designation" is given. Testimony was also given as
to the general water geology of the area and the probability
of water on drilling. But the important part of this testimony was that the value of the land under the Application
was not appraised as though the water from the well was in
fact, being pumped and applied. Rather, the property was
appraised as it was found in the market as of the date of
taking with the probable potential in the foreseeable future
of water being available via the application. Such testimony
and evidence fully accords with the "rule of probability" in
eminent domain as recognized by this Court throughout the
decisions. State Road Comm. v. Jacobs, supra; Tanner v.
Provo Bench and Canal Co., supra; State Road Comm. v.
Estate of Ida Holt, 14 U. 2d 235, 381 P. 2d 724 (1963).
Whether such evidence, once admitted, was credible and to
be believed was a question of fact solely for the jury and
its determination will not be overturned.
CONCLUSION
The appeal by the State herein is a complete nonsequitur. It asks that the Court recognize the Judgment of
Just Compensation as valid so far as value of the con-
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·demned land is concerned, but declare the same Judgment
invalid wilth respect to severance damag,es. Such request
legally is an impossible accomplishment since there is but
one judgment in which is merged all factors of Just Compensation as by law defined in 78-34-10 U.C.A. 1953. The
integrated judgment is either good or it isn't and a party
may not appeal piecemeal issues which have been merged
in the final judgment. 78-34-16 U.C.A. 1953; Rule 72 (a)
U.R.C.P.; Thomson v. Thomson, 5 Uta:h 401 (1888); 4 Am.
Jur. 2d 571, App. and Err. §49; 4 C.J.S. 297, App. and Err.
§lOH.
1

In asking not for a new trial but the elimination of
severance damages from the Judgment, Appellant's appeal
is f~ven more of a paradox. For under its "replacement"
theory, as erroneous as its is, there would have to be reoognized substantial severance damages in accordance with the
controlling case law and due process. (See Point II paragrap (1) herein).
This case was properly and typically tried by District
Judge Day. A verdict, after four days of trial, was returned fully ,supported by the believable evidence. The appeal herein is without legal significance under the already
established precedent, and this Court should affirm the
Judgment of the trial Court, we do respectfully submit.
Respectfully submitted,
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